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We analyze newly available data from the Health and Retirement Study on senior 
citizens’ take-up of Medicare Part D and the associated SSA Low-Income Subsidy. We 
find that economic factors – specifically, demand for prescription drugs - drove the 
decision to enroll in Part D. For the most part, individuals with employer-sponsored 
coverage in 2004 kept that coverage, as they should have. Individuals with no 
prescription drug coverage in 2004 mostly enrolled in Part D or obtained other coverage; 
many of those who remained without coverage reported that they do not use prescribed 
medicines. Take-up of the SSA “Extra Help” subsidy seems to have been more 
problematic, with many Part D beneficiaries unaware of the subsidy program or unsure 
about their eligibility. There is apparent under-reporting in the HRS of participation in the 
subsidy program, suggesting that some who profess to be unaware of the program may 
actually be participating in it. In terms of respondents’ subjective experiences of 
decision-making, the majority report having had little or no difficulty with the Part D 
enrollment decision and being confident that they made the right decision. Thus, for the 
most part, despite the complexity of the program, Medicare beneficiaries seem to have 
been able to make economically rational decisions in which they had confidence, 
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1. Introduction 
The new Medicare prescription drug benefit, commonly referred to as “Part D,” 
began in January 2006. Unlike Medicare Parts A and B, takeup of which is close to 
universal among eligible individuals as a result of essentially automatic enrollment, Part 
D requires most beneficiaries to make an active choice about whether or not to 
participate.  Beneficiaries who want to enroll in Part D must choose a prescription drug 
insurance plan and, in most cases, pay a separate premium for this coverage.  Low-
income beneficiaries are also eligible for a subsidy to help cover the Part D premium, 
deductible and copayments, but this subsidy requires an application that is separate from 
Part D enrollment. Part D and the accompanying low-income subsidy therefore required 
most eligible beneficiaries to make a series of active decisions in order to take up 
benefits. 
  How successfully did elderly Medicare beneficiaries navigate the complex set of 
choices presented by Part D?  In particular, we are interested in whether beneficiaries 
took up benefits that were available to them. Understanding takeup is interesting for at 
least three reasons.  First, we want to know whether these benefits are reaching the 
individuals they are intended to help. Second, low rates of takeup may suggest costs of 
enrolling that reduce the value of the program even for those who enroll. In the words of 
Blundell et al. (1988): “the existence of non-take-up also suggests that there are costs 
associated with claiming, which not only deter non-claimants but also partly offset the 
value of benefits to those who do claim.”  Third, the underlying “managed competition” 
framework of the Part D program, in which individuals choose private insurance plans in 
a regulated and subsidized market, forms the basis for many proposals to expand health 
insurance coverage in the under-65 population as well.
1  The primary alternative 
framework for policies to expand coverage is one in which government functions as 
insurer, like Part A of the Medicare program. The success or failure of Part D becomes, 
in effect, an important test case for the potential of market-based reforms relying on 
private plans and individual choices to expand insurance coverage. 
                                                 
1 For example, the Clinton health care plan in the early 1990s and the health care reform proposals of 
current Democratic candidates John Edwards and Barack Obama are all built on a framework of managed 
competition.   2
A priori, there is considerable reason to expect low takeup of both Part D and the 
associated subsidy. Takeup of most social benefits is low (for a review, see Currie 2004).  
Moreoever, the tasks required of prospective Part D enrollees – who in most cases had to 
decide not only whether to take up the program but also had to choose a plan from a 
menu of complicated options – are considerably more complex than deciding whether or 
not take up programs like SSI or Food Stamps.  Medicare beneficiares may be 
particularly ill-suited to tackle these complex decisions because many of them have 
aging-related cognitive limitations. The difficulties associated with the introduction of 
Medicare HMOs in 1997, which were initially unpopular with enrollees, is a discouraging 
example of how such a scenario might play out. 
In this paper, we present evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
which suggests that in spite of all of these challenges, takeup of Part D among elderly 
Medicare beneficiaries was relatively high, and that most beneficiaries made good 
decisions about which they felt confident.  Only 7 percent of all seniors lack drug 
coverage in 2006 compared with 23 percent in 2004.Focusing on the relatively small 
group of eligible individuals who chose to go without coverage, there is very little 
evidence to suggest that substantial numbers of them were confused or misinformed; 
rather, they appear to have low demand for prescription drugs, and may have been quite 
rational in their decision not to sign up for Part D. 
Takeup of the subsidy program, on the other hand, seems to have been low even 
compared with the low rates of takeup for other social programs.  Here, lack of 
information seems to have been a factor.  Many respondents reported that they did not 
apply because they had not heard of the program and many more gave responses 
suggesting that they were confused about the subsidy.  Although running the subsidy 
application process through SSA may have reduced stigma, and was administratively 
simpler because in most cases Part D premiums were paid by deduction from Social 
Security payments, it may have added to the cognitive demands.  
Despite the apparent low take-up of the low-income subsidy, there is no apparent 
difference in Part D coverage between the subsidy-eligible and other groups, even when 
Medicaid recipients are set aside.  That is, the fraction of seniors who have no drug 
coverage is about the same at all income levels. Thus, it appears that low-income groups   3
did navigate the program and are receiving the benefits of the heavily subsidized 
insurance of Part D, but are not fully benefiting from the extra help available to them. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the relevant 
institutional features of the Part D benefit and the associated low-income subsidy. Section 
3 discusses the literature on economic models of program takeup.  Section 4 discusses the 
HRS data available for evaluating takeup of Part D and the subsidy and how we define 
key variables for our analysis.  Section 5 presents descriptive and multivariate results, 
and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results. 
2. Background on Part D and the Low-Income Subsidy 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 established the prescription drug 
benefit known as “Part D,” which is administered by the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). In addition, the Act also established a means-tested subsidy to 
help cover premiums, deductibles and copayments for beneficiaries with low incomes 
and few assets. The application and approval process for the low-income subsidy 
(referred to as “extra help” in the public information campaign) is handled by SSA.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that about 1/3 of Medicare beneficiaries would 
qualify for the means-tested subsidy, which, if used, would represent about a 20% 
increase in income for those at the poverty level (CBO, 2004)   
  Medicare  beneficiaries  were  affected  very differently by Part D and the subsidy 
depending on what their prior prescription drug insurance was.   
•  Individuals with “other creditable coverage” – that is, insurance coverage with 
actuarial value greater than or equal to the standard Part D plan – were 
instructed to keep that coverage.  This was, for the most part, employer-
sponsored group coverage, and those employers received a subsidy from the 
government to continue offering it.   
•  Medicaid-covered Medicare beneficiaries (“dual eligibles”) were 
automatically enrolled in both Part D and the subsidy.  
•  Medicare Advantage plans (HMOs), many of which were already providing 
drug coverage prior to 2006, essentially had to offer drug coverage under Part 
D, so that Medicare HMO enrollees were more or less assured of participating   4
in Part D.
2 Medicare HMO enrollees interested in applying for the subsidy had 
to make a separate application to SSA including information on income and 
assets.  
•  Individuals with privately purchased prescription drug insurance or with no 
coverage for prescription drugs had to decide whether they wanted to enroll in 
Part D and if so choose a plan and sign up for it.
3  They also had the option of 
enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan—many of which were marketed by 
the same companies as stand-alone Part D plans. If they wanted to apply for 
the subsidy they had to make a separate application including information on 
income and assets to SSA.  
    In effect, then, individuals with privately purchased drug coverage and individuals 
with no drug coverage had to decide whether or not to sign up for Part D and whether or 
not to apply for the subsidy; Medicare HMO enrollees had to decide only whether or not 
to apply for the subsidy. Individuals with employer-sponsored coverage had no decisions 
to make. Medicaid/Medicare dual eligibles could either do nothing and be automatically 
enrolled in both a Part D plan and the subsidy, or they could actively choose a plan and 
switch into it from the one to which they had been automatically assigned. 
    Eligibility for the subsidy is based on beneficiaries’ income and assets.  Individuals 
with incomes below 135 percent of the poverty level and assets below $6,000 for singles 
or $10,000 for couples were eligible for a full subsidy in 2006.  A partial subsidy was 
available for individuals with incomes up to 150 percent of the poverty level and assets 
below $9,000 for singles or $20,000 for couples.  The definition of income used for 
eligibility differs from that used to calculate poverty levels because it excludes some 
types of income.  Specifically, the income of other household members is not counted, 
and the poverty thresholds for one and two-person households apply for single and 
married individuals.  In addition, the first $240 of annual income is disregarded; the first 
$720 of annual earnings and half of all earnings above that level is also disregarded.  
                                                 
2 Enrollees in Medicare HMOs could not enroll in a stand-alone Part D plan without losing their Medicare 
HMO benefits for outpatient and inpatient care, so that in effect Medicare HMOs not already providing 
drug coverage would have lost most of their enrollees if they had not started to provide it.  Of course,  
3 Medigap plans that included prescription drug coverage prior to 2006 could continue to sell that product 
to existing enrollees but could not enroll new members.  Presumably, any Medigap plan that included drug 
coverage became a Part D plan.   5
Assets include all liquid assets; a beneficiary’s primary residence and vehicles are not 
counted.  As a result, the rates of eligibility for at least partial subsidy are considerably 
higher than poverty rates. 
  Prior estimates of eligibility for the subsidy suggest that 13.2 million people, 
approximately one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries meet the income and asset tests, 
and of these roughly 7.6 million would not need to apply for it because they were 
“deemed” eligible and automatically enrolled (Medicaid recipients and a few others), or 
had other coverage.  That means that 6.6 million, or about 15% of the Medicare 
population were potentially eligible but would need to apply. 
  Both SSA and CMS advertised the subsidy program heavily.  According to the 
Government Accountability Office in testimony before Senate Finance Committee in 
May of 2007 (GAO-07-858T), SSA held over 75,000 local events, mailed information 
letters to 18 million Medicare beneficiaries thought to be potentially eligible, and through 
a contractor made followup telephone calls to 9 million people.  The main period of effort 
was May to November of 2005, prior to the start of Part D coverage. By the end of 2005, 
4 million people had applied for the subsidy, and 1 million had been approved.  Of the 
6.2 million applications received by March of 2007, 2.2 million had been approved, 2.6 
million refused, and 1.4 million judged as duplicates or unnecessary because the 
applicant was already in the program or covered by Medicaid. 
3. Economic models of program take-up.  
Moffitt (1983) is considered the starting point of modern economic models of 
program take-up.  He used a simple utility-maximizing framework to incorporate both the 
magnitude of potential benefits and the costs of enrollment and participation.  He focused 
in particular on “stigma”—psychic costs associated with means-tested welfare programs.  
Subsequent research has found pure stigma effects to be relatively unimportant, while 
transactions costs—the time spent navigating the system—can be quite significant (see 
Currie, 2004 for a review of the take-up literature).  A priori, since Medicare Parts A and 
B have near-universal take-up, we would not expect much stigma to be associated with 
taking up the new benefits under Part D. Given the complexity of the program, 
transaction costs might be quite significant for Part D.   6
    Most of the programs considered in the takeup literature have no direct financial 
cost to the user, so the only costs of taking up the program are stigma or transaction costs.  
Part D is different in that it also has a direct financial cost: the premium the beneficiary 
must pay.  For some fraction of the eligible population, the premium exceeds the 
individual’s expected benefit from the program, so that individuals may quite reasonably 
decide not to participate. In particular, individuals with low expected total prescription 
drug spending should not take up the plan because they would pay more in premiums 
than they would get in benefits. Winter et al. (2006a) estimate that the “break-even point” 
in 2006 is about $842; that is, individuals with total spending below $842 are financially 
better off not signing up for Part D. They estimate that about 27 percent of the Medicare 
population has spending below this level.  This estimate does not take into account the 
option value created by the penalty for signing up for Part D later or the risk premium 
that risk-averse individuals should be willing to pay even if their expected spending for 
the year falls somewhat below the break-even amount. Either of these factors should push 
more individuals into signing up. On the other hand, it also does not take into account any 
stigma or transaction costs, which would discourage people from signing up.  These 
factors work in opposite directions and it is impossible to estimate any of their 
magnitudes at the individual level.  The take-home point, though, is that for a sizeable 
chunk of the Medicare population – maybe as much as one-quarter – signing up for Part 
D may not be a good deal. 
    The Low-Income Subsidy (LIS), on the other hand, has no direct costs and is 
means-tested, so that takeup of the subsidy is more like takeup of other welfare programs 
where stigma, transaction costs and lack of information are the leading candidates to 
explain low takeup. The administration clearly intended to encourage applications for the 
subsidy, as evidenced by the following quotation from the CMS webpage about the 
program: 
Remember, as Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt says, 
"If in doubt, fill it out!" 
Nonetheless, existing research suggests that the elderly take up other means-tested social 
programs at particularly low rates; see, for example analyses of Food Stamps by Haider 
et al. (2003), of Medicaid by (Pezzin and Kasper (2000), and of SSI by McGarry (1995)   7
and by Elder and Powers (2004, 2006). These results suggest that takeup of the Low-
Income Subsidy is likely to be low. 
4. Data.  
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is the best resource available for 
longitudinal studies of health and economic well-being.  The original HRS cohort, born 
1931-41 and first interviewed in 1992 at the ages of 51-61, was interviewed again for the 
eighth time in 2006, at the ages of 65-75.  Thus, all age-eligible members of that cohort 
are now age-eligible for Medicare.  With the other cohorts added after 1992, the HRS 
now represents the full population of Medicare beneficiaries over age 65. In all, our 
sample includes 10,175 Medicare-covered individuals ages 65 and older in 2006 who 
were also present in 2004.
4 
4A. Defining respondents’ prescription drug insurance coverage  
In the 2004 HRS, respondents had as many as three opportunities to provide information 
about insurance coverage for prescribed medicines: 
•  Respondents with Medicare or Medicaid insurance coverage are asked if they get 
these benefits through an HMO. If they do, they are asked whether the 
Medicare/Medicaid HMO covers prescription drugs (and other questions about that 
HMO). 
•  For up to three private insurance plans, respondents report the source of coverage 
(own employer, spouse’s employer, privately purchased, etc.) and whether or not the 
plan covers prescription drugs. 
•  In the section on utilization of medical care, all respondents are asked whether they 
regularly take any prescription medications. If they do, they are asked “Have the costs 
of your prescription medications been completely covered by health insurance, 
mostly covered, only partially covered, or not covered at all by insurance?” 
Respondents who do not regularly take any prescription drugs are asked whether they 
have insurance coverage that would cover the cost of drugs if they took any. All 
                                                 
4 In 2006, the HRS has 11,355 respondents ages 65 and older and 7,116 under 65.  Of the respondents ages 
65 and older, 415 say they do not have Medicare coverage and another 765 have no data from 2004; after 
discarding these observations, we have a usable sample of 10,175 respondents ages 65 and older with 
Medicare in 2006 who were also present in the HRS in 2004.   8
respondents are asked to provide the name of the plan that covers or would cover 
prescription drug expenses.  
    The 2006 HRS includes an additional question to the beginning of the sequence on 
insurance coverage. Immediately after asking respondents about whether they have 
Medicare, before any of the questions listed above are asked, respondents are asked 
“Beginning in 2006, Part D of Medicare provides coverage for prescription drugs. Have 
you signed up for the new Medicare prescription drug coverage?”  Other questions about 
Part D, including whether or not the person applied for the SSA subsidy, follow. 
    Based on this information, we assign respondents prescription drug coverage in the 
following hierarchical order (that is, if a respondent reports more than on of these types 
of coverage, s/he is assigned the first one in this list): 
1.  Employer coverage (including CHAMPUS/Tricare)  
2.  Medicaid  
3.  Medicare HMO  
4.  Part D (2006 only) 
5.  Privately purchased drug coverage; this category includes both respondents who 
report having a private non-group insurance policy that covers prescription drugs 
and respondents who do not report any of the above types of coverage but who 
report that their prescription drugs are or would be covered by insurance.
5   
6.  No coverage is assigned to respondents with none of the above types of coverage. 
4B. Data on takeup of the low-income subsidy 
    In 2006, the HRS asked: “Have you applied to Social Security for extra help in 
paying for your prescription drugs?”  Those who answered yes were then asked “Did you 
receive any extra help from Social Security?” whereas those who answered no were 
asked why not.  At the beginning of the field period, only persons who said they had 
signed up for Part D were asked about extra help.  This was subsequently changed to ask 
all Medicare beneficiaries.  About one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries in HRS were not 
asked about extra help, all of whom said they had not signed up for Part D, but some of 
whom may have been subsidy-eligible.  Appendix table 1 shows how respondents in each 
                                                 
5 In a few cases, we recode responses based on the name of the plan respondents say is covering/would 
cover their drug expenses (e.g. “Medicaid” and “CHAMPUS” are recoded appropriately).   9
of the coverage categories we defined responded to questions about Part D and subsidy 
takeup. In practice, this is not a problem for those with employer coverage or those with 
Medicaid, whose subsidy status is known based on their insurance coverage.  Nor is it a 
problem for the respondents with stand-alone Part D coverage since, by our definition, 
they all said yes to the question about Part D and were therefore asked about the subsidy.  
The main problem is for Medicare HMO enrollees, only about half of whom responded 
that they had signed up for Part D. As a result, subsidy application data is missing for a 
quarter of those with Medicare HMO drug coverage.  In the analysis that follows, present 
a range of results for Medicare HMO enrollees using different assumptions about what 
the missing values mean. 
4C. Other variables 
Prescription drug use 2004: In the 2004 core survey, respondents are asked whether they 
take medication to treat high blood pressure, diabetes, heart conditions (AMI, angina, 
congestive heart failure), stroke, or psychiatric conditions. We use the number of 
conditions for which medications are taken (0-5) in 2004 as a measure of demand for 
prescription drugs. 
Prescription drug use 2006: In the 2006 core survey, respondents are asked whether they 
take medication to treat high blood pressure, diabetes, heart conditions (AMI, angina, 
congestive heart failure), stroke, or psychiatric conditions, and in addition whether they 
take prescription drugs for pain, allergy/asthma, GI problems, cholesterol, sleep aid, or 
anxiety/depression. We use the number of conditions for which medications are taken (0-
11) in 2006 as a measure of demand for prescription drugs.  This has obvious potential 
endogeneity problems.  However, the fact that Part D offered insurance to everyone 
actually lessens the endogeneity problems of prior drug use, which was strongly 
conditioned on the unequal availability of insurance.  In work not reported here, we have 
found that the number of medications reported in late 2005 in a separate mail survey prior 
to Part D shows results very similar to this. 
Subsidy eligibility: Eligibility for the low-income subsidy is based on the rules described 
above.  Using detailed HRS data on 2005 income and assets, which are reported in the 
2006 core survey, we are able to follow the eligibility rules quite closely in order to   10
construct measures of countable income and assets for purposes of determining 
eligibility. 
Cognition: In the HRS core survey, interviewers read a list of ten words to respondents, 
who then recall as many words as they can. They are asked to recall the words 
immediately after hearing the list and also several minutes later.  We use the sum of these 
from the 2006 survey, ranging from 0 to 20, as an indicator of cognitive ability.  Many 
respondents who have difficulty with this task refuse to complete it and have missing data 
as a result, so we treat missing data as a separate category for this variable. 
Health: Respondents report their own health status as excellent, very good, good, fair, 
poor in every wave of the HRS core.  We use data on self-reported health in 2004. 
Education: Respondents are classified into four groups based on their reported 
educational attainment at the baseline interview: less than high school, high school 
graduate, some college, college graduate or more. 
Demographic variables: We also include race (white, black, other nonwhite), ethnicity 
(Hispanic, non-Hispanic), marital status and age as explanatory variables in our analysis. 
5. Results 
    Table 1 shows the distribution of this sample by type of insurance coverage in 2004 
and also characteristics for each subgroup.
6  In 2004, nearly a quarter (23 percent) of the 
sample had no prescription drug coverage.   About a third (34.5 percent) had drug 
coverage through an employer plan and another 23 percent had coverage through an 
individually purchased private plan; Medicare HMOs and Medicaid covered another 12 
and 7 percent, respectively.   
    Overall, 28 percent of respondents report that they are in fair or poor health. Two-
thirds of them take medication to treat one or more of high blood pressure, diabetes, heart 
conditions (AMI, angina, congestive heart failure), stroke, or psychiatric conditions.
7  
Medicaid recipients are in noticeably worse health than the other groups, with almost 60 
percent in fair or poor health and nearly 80 percent using prescription drugs for one of the 
five conditions listed above. Overall, almost one-third of the sample reports 2005 income 
                                                 
6 All estimates in our analysis, except for those reported as unweighted sample sizes, are weighted using the 
preliminary 2006 respondent weights. 
7 These are the conditions for which use of prescription drugs was asked in Section C in 2004.   11
and assets below the subsidy eligibility level for Part D in 2006.  Thus, HRS data seems 
consistent with prior estimates of eligibility rates. 
    Table 2 shows the distribution of prescription drug insurance coverage in 2006, 
overall and also by coverage status in 2004.  Overall, 25.7 percent of the sample had 
stand-alone Part D coverage in 2006, 15.1% had Medicare Advantage plans, and only 7.5 
percent had no coverage, compared with 23 percent with no coverage in 2004.  These 
figures are broadly consistent with CMS reports for 2006, which found about 24% of 
beneficiaries in stand-alone plans,  13% in HMOs, and under 10% with no coverage.  
Among those who had no coverage in 2004, just over half (52.5 percent) enrolled in a 
Part D plan in 2006, with another 7.1 percent covered by Medicare HMOs.  One-third of 
individuals who had been purchasing private prescription drug coverage enrolled in Part 
D plans in 2006, with another 9.6 percent covered by Medicare HMOs.  A first estimate 
of Part D takeup, then, appears to be somewhere between 25 and 50 percent, depending 
on how it is defined.  
    Table 3 presents results for the sample categorized according to income and assets 
relative to eligibility thresholds for the SSA low-income subsidy for Part D.  There is 
surprisingly little variation across these groups in the fraction enrolled in Part D (25 to 30 
percent) or the fraction with privately purchased coverage (11 or 12 percent).  The main 
difference across these groups is in the fraction with employer versus Medicaid coverage. 
Better-off households are much more likely to have employer coverage, which covers 
41.5 percent of the richest group compared to only 21.2 percent of subsidy-eligible 
respondents. Medicaid covers almost as many subsidy-eligible respondents as employer 
coverage (19.7 percent) but almost none of the richer respondents. These differences by 
income offset each other so that the fraction with no coverage is about 7 or 8 percent in 
each group.  That is, rich and poor elderly individuals are equally likely to lack 
prescription drug coverage. 
    Very few respondents reported that they had applied for the SSA low-income 
subsidy.  Only 13 percent of respondents with stand-alone Part D coverage reported 
having done so (Table 3), with about half of these reporting that they had gotten the 
subsidy.  Subsidy application rates were about 9 to 10 percent among respondents whom 
we categorize as close to the eligibility threshold, and were negligible (2 percent) among   12
respondents who reported both income and assets high enough to disqualify them from 
eligibility. Subsidy applications appear to have been slightly less likely from Medicare 
HMO enrollees but because of the high rate of missing data discussed above we cannot 
say conclusively how their takeup rate compares to that for beneficiaries in stand-alone 
Part D plans.  Table 4 shows the distribution of outcomes by subsidy eligibility status that 
these conditional takeup rates imply. 
    Although precise comparisons will require age-specific administrative data and 
sampling weights for the HRS 2006 sample, it is clear from these counts that reported 
applications and receipt of the low-income subsidy in HRS are low relative to published 
administrative estimates.  According to GAO, applications represented about 14% of the 
number of Medicare beneficiaries, and the approval rate was about one-third of that, so 
about 5% of Medicare beneficiaries have LIS approval. By contrast, only about 3% of 
older Medicare beneficiaries in HRS even reported an application.  A higher rate, about 
half, report approval, but the count of approved beneficiaries is still far lower than 
administrative estimates. This shortfall is much too large to be explained by the change in 
skip patterns.  It must be the case that some people who receive the low-income subsidy 
nevertheless answered no to the question about applying to Social Security for extra help.  
One indication that this may be so is the number of people without the subsidy who 
report paying nothing in premiums.  A likely explanation is that people filled out the 
subsidy application at the same time as they signed up for Part D and did not consider the 
two to be separate actions but rather all part of Part D.  Future work will attempt to 
identify which of the non-reporters may actually be covered.  Ultimately, administrative 
linkages to SSA and CMS data should permit a definitive answer. 
Defining takeup 
    Our aim is to study takeup as an economic behavior, i.e., a choice made by a 
relevant subset of the population. Many different definitions of “takeup” are possible 
depending on what choice we wish to study and how we define the population at risk for 
the choice.  We might be interested in knowing what fraction of previously uninsured 
individuals signed up for stand-alone Part D plans, or we might also want to count 
anyone who enrolled in a Medicare HMO as “taking up” Part D coverage. If we are 
interested in knowing what fraction of eligible beneficiaries are being reached by this   13
program we might want to count Medicaid recipients as well, even though they have no 
active takeup decision to make since they were automatically enrolled in Part D. Table 5 
lists seven possible definitions of Part D takeup and nine possible definitions of takeup 
for the “Extra Help” subsidy.  The last column of the table shows the sample size in the 
denominator of the fraction for each takeup calculation. In the multivariate analysis that 
follows I will present results for all of these outcomes. 
    Table 6 shows the average takeup, overall and by income/asset category, for each 
different definition of takeup.  Estimates of Part D takeup range from 41 percent using 
respondent-reported Part D coverage to define takeup to 72.5 percent, counting Part D 
plans, Medicare HMOs, and Medicaid as Part D and including everyone except 
individuals with employer coverage in 2006 as “eligible” for being in Part D.  Estimates 
of subsidy takeup (defined as applying to Social Security for extra help) range from 4.4 
percent using the respondent-reported measure of subsidy takeup (and keeping in mind 
the missing data problem discussed above) to 29 percent using the most inclusive 
possible definition of subsidy takeup, which includes categorizing Medicare HMO 
enrollees with missing subsidy data as having applied for the subsidy. 
    Table 7 shows coefficients and standard errors from seven different linear 
probability models with the seven different Part D takeup variables as outcomes.  Even 
though the different takeup have very different means, they have very similar patterns of 
response to covariates.  So, for example, every measure of takeup shows that individuals 
with more conditions for which they take prescribed medicines are more likely to take up 
Part D.  Individuals in worse self-reported health are also consistently more likely to take 
up Part D, although this result is not significant in all specifications.  Individuals with 
better memory scores are consistently more likely to sign up for Part D.  Education and 
demographic characteristics like race and marital status are either insignificant or have 
inconsistent effects across the different definitions of takeup.  There is not much of an 
income or asset gradient in takeup.
8 Thus, it appears that Part D takeup was driven mostly 
by demand for prescription drugs, although there is also evidence that individuals with 
                                                 
8 In results not reported here, we estimated regression which break up all of the continuous variables into 
sets of dummies (for example self-reported health becomes a set of four dummies instead of a linear 
variable with values 1-5).  This does reveal some nonlinearities in the effect of covariates, but overall the 
results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported here.   14
better cognitive functioning (memory) were more likely to sign up. We plan to 
investigate this result further in the future using additional detailed data from the HRS on 
other dimensions of cognition, such as numeracy. 
    Table 8 presents analogous results for nine separate regressions with the different 
definitions of subsidy takeup as dependent variables. Individuals in worse self-reported 
health are more likely to apply for the subsidy; the effect of number of prescriptions is 
small and insignificant in the specifications that do not include Medicaid recipients 
among those “taking up” the subsidy but is significant and positive in the specifications 
that do.  Older respondents are less likely to sign up for the subsidy, consistent with the 
results of Haider et al. (2003) for Food Stamps. Individuals with more education or 
higher memory scores are less likely to apply for the subsidy, in contrast to a positive 
effect of memory scores on Part D takeup noted above; the effect of memory score on 
subsidy takeup is inconsistent across specifications, however. As one would expect, more 
income or assets means individuals are less likely to apply for the subsidy. The effect of 
demographics (race and except in specifications that include Medicaid recipients among 
those who take up in which case black, other nonwhite and Hispanic all have big effects. 
Why do people say they didn’t sign up? 
    Respondents’ own stated reasons for not signing up for Part D or the subsidy may 
be at least as illuminating as the multivariate regression results.  Table 9 tabulates those 
responses for individuals with privately purchased coverage and no coverage in 2006. 
Options 1-6 in table 9 were the multiple choice responses to the HRS survey question 
about why respondents did not enroll in Part D while responses 7A through 7D are based 
on text responses entered by interviewers when the respondent chose “other” from the 
multiple choice menu. An undergraduate research assistant categorized these text 
responses into the categories shown between the dashed lines in Table 9. The entries for 
these categories are sample sizes in each cell rather than cell fractions to emphasize the 
fact that there are very few responses in any one of these categories. 
    Table 9 shows that as you might expect, about two-thirds of all respondents with 
privately purchased coverage in 2006 report that they did not sign up for Part D because 
they already have coverage.  Very few (2.3 percent) chose the response “I didn’t know it 
was available;” a few (6.2 percent) didn’t sign up because they do not use any   15
prescription drugs.  The detailed analysis of the text responses for respondents with 
privately purchased coverage offers little evidence to support the view that people did not 
sign up because they were unaware of the program or confused. 
    Table 9 also shows responses to “why didn’t you sign up?” for respondents whom 
we classified as having no prescription drug coverage. Eleven percent of these 
respondents report that they did not sign up for Part D because they already had good 
coverage, raising concern about measurement error in our drug coverage variable. Very 
few uninsured respondents say they did not know about the plan (1.4 percent) or heard 
about it too late (1.9 percent).  A significant fraction (12.9 percent) report not having 
made a decision yet, which may reflect the fact that enrollment in Part D was open 
through May 15, 2006 and HRS interviews took place throughout 2006.  Again, there is 
very little evidence to support the view that confusion or lack of information prevented 
uninsured respondents from signing up for Part D coverage. 
    There is more evidence that confusion and, especially, lack of information help 
explain why respondents did not apply for the subsidy.  Table 10 presents a tabulation of 
respondent reasons why they did not sign up; as in Table 9, options 1 through 6 were 
presented to respondents as a menu of reasons for not signing up, while options 7A 
through 7F were based on text responses recorded by interviewers and analyzed by an 
undergraduate research assistant. We report these responses for those with Medicare 
HMO coverage and Part D coverage, both overall and only for those whom we classify as 
subsidy-eligible. A quarter of respondents overall and 36 percent of subsidy-eligible 
respondents report that they did not apply for the subsidy because they did not know 
about it.  Fully 41 percent of subsidy-eligible respondents in stand-alone Part D plans 
report not having known about the subsidy. 
How difficult was the decision? 
    The Part D plan was introduced to apparently widespread confusion and predictions 
that the elderly would be unable to make good decisions given such complex choices.  In 
spite of this expectation, only about one in six respondents reports that the decision was 
“very” or “somewhat” difficult (Table 11).  The remainder reported that it was not very 
difficult or not at all difficult, or that they did not make the decision themselves (someone   16
else chose for them or they were automatically enrolled).
9 –Enrollees in stand-alone Part 
D plans did have more difficulty than the other groups; 36 percent of them reported a 
decision that was very or somewhat difficult.  But even for this group – and significantly, 
even for Part D enrollees with very poor memory scores, less than half found the decision 
difficult. 
    Moreover, the majority (69 percent) of Part D plan enrollees reported feeling “very 
confident” or “somewhat confident” about having made the right decision, and 86 percent 
of them planned to sign up again the following year.  Those who did not enroll mostly did 
not plan to sign up the following year (21.4 percent of those with privately purchased 
coverage and 34.6 percent of those with no coverage). 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
    We emphasize that this research is at a very preliminary stage. Our results suggest 
that takeup of Part D was indeed very high with fewer than 10% of seniors left without 
coverage, and driven primarily by economic considerations – in particular, those with 
higher use of prescription drugs or worse self-reported health in 2004 were more likely to 
sign up for Part D, all else equal. Respondents’ stated reasons for declining Part D also 
suggest that people knew what they were doing and that confusion was not a significant 
factor keeping potential beneficiaries out of Part D.  Consistent with other reports about 
the subsidy program, our analysis of subsidy applications paints a somewhat different 
picture, although as noted above our analysis is limited somewhat by missing data and by 
apparent underreporting of subsidy participation.  The available data suggest that few 
respondents applied for the subsidy and that many subsidy-eligible respondents were not 
aware of the subsidy, in spite of significant outreach efforts by SSA, and despite their 
participation in Part D. 
                                                 
9 Note that this table treats Medicaid enrollees’ responses about difficulty of the enrollment decision at face 
value even though in theory all of them should have been automatically enrolled in the program.  Medicaid 
respondents were only asked about difficulty/confidence if they did not report having been automatically 
enrolled.   17
Table 1 




Prescription drug insurance coverage in 2004   
 Employer Medicaid 
Medicare 
HMO Purchase  None  Total 
Row percent:  0.345 0.074 0.119 0.232  0.230 1.000
Sample n  3,500 891 1,132 2,306  2,346 10,175
            
Age (2006)  73.3 75.7 75.6 76.8  76.4 75.3
Female 0.486 0.714 0.557 0.650  0.616 0.579
Black 0.061 0.229 0.062 0.087  0.069 0.081
Other nonwhite race  0.026 0.096 0.033 0.022  0.019 0.029
Hispanic 0.028 0.275 0.097 0.042  0.047 0.062
Health in 2004:   
 Fair/poor  health  0.216 0.594 0.251 0.291  0.271 0.278
   Any conditions with rx?  0.676 0.782 0.657 0.696  0.615 0.672
  Number of conditions with rx 
  If > 0 (max=5)
10 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.6  1.4 1.6
  Mean memory score (0-20)  9.7 7.2 9.0 8.6  8.7 9.0
  Memory score missing  0.063 0.137 0.060 0.071  0.070 0.072
   
Education < HS  0.160 0.659 0.227 0.296  0.278 0.263777
Education = HS  0.357 0.249 0.376 0.369  0.381 0.359
Some college  0.206 0.061 0.206 0.175  0.189 0.184
College+ 0.277 0.031 0.191 0.159  0.153 0.193
Income/assets in 2005:   
 Subsidy  eligible  0.176 0.821 0.260 0.330  0.325 0.304
  Income too high  0.304 0.142 0.337 0.273  0.273 0.282
  Assets too high  0.046 0.013 0.062 0.069  0.061 0.054
  Both too high  0.475 0.024 0.341 0.327  0.341 0.360
                                                 
10High blood pressure, diabetes, heart conditions, stroke, psychiatric conditions   18
Table 2 
Prescription drug coverage in 2004 and 2006 




Prescription drug insurance coverage in 2006   
 
Coverage in 2004:  Employer  Medicaid MedHMO Part D   Purchase  None  Total 
 
 
Employer  0.685 0.009 0.080 0.109  0.098  0.019 1.000 
   [2,408]  [39]  [261]  [387] [334]  [71] [3,500] 
 
 
Medicaid 0.026  0.683  0.044  0.171  0.055  0.022  1.000 
   [22]  [629]  [38]  [139] [43]  [20] [891] 
 
 
Medicare HMO  0.115  0.027  0.705  0.069  0.071  0.014  1.000 
   [129]  [38]  [788]  [86] [74] [17]  [1,132] 
 
 
Purchase 0.274  0.046  0.096  0.334  0.196  0.056  1.000 
   [615]  [138]  [215]  [764] [441] [133]  [2,306] 
 
 
None 0.062  0.035  0.071  0.522  0.097  0.212  1.000 
   [144]  [101]  [173]  [1,215] [226]  [487] [2,346] 
 
 
Total  0.332 0.073 0.153 0.257  0.114  0.072 1.000 
    [3,318] [945] [1,475]  [2,591] [1,118]  [728]  [10,175] 
Notes: Table entries are   weighted row percent 
         [unweighted  cell  counts] 
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Table 3 













     
Total 
Row percent  0.304 0.282 0.054  0.361  1.000
Sample n  3,302 2,923 523  3,427  10,175
          
Distribution of 2004 Rx coverage:           
 Employer    0.200  0.372  0.291  0.454  0.345 
 Medicaid    0.199  0.037  0.018  0.005  0.074 
  Medicare HMO   0.102  0.143  0.136  0.113  0.119 
 Purchase    0.253  0.225  0.298  0.211  0.232 
 None    0.246  0.223  0.257  0.217  0.230 
Total   1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
          
Distribution of 2006 Rx coverage:           
 Employer    0.212 0.345 0.326  0.415  0.329
 Medicaid    0.197 0.043 0.017  0.006  0.075
  Medicare HMO   0.128 0.185 0.158  0.153  0.155
  Part D   0.273 0.245 0.295  0.247  0.257
 Purchase    0.117 0.112 0.121  0.111  0.114
 None    0.073 0.070 0.082  0.069  0.071
Total   1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000
          
Prob(apply for subsidy)     
  Part D enrollees  0.134 0.094 0.100  0.019  0.081
  Medicare HMO enrollees     
  Yes  0.052 0.028 0.000  0.013  0.027
  No  0.736 0.676 0.843  0.721  0.716
  Not  asked  0.212 0.296 0.157  0.266  0.257
Outcome of subsidy application 
(PDP/MedHMO enrollees)         
 Approved  0.566 0.290 0.187  0.329  0.430
 Denied  0.328 0.644 0.656  0.603  0.477
 Waiting  0.107 0.067 0.157  0.068  0.094
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Table 4 













     
Total 
Row percent  0.304 0.282 0.054  0.361  1.000
Sample n  3,302 2,923 523  3,427  10,175
    
Employer 0.212 0.345 0.326  0.415  0.329
Medicaid 0.197 0.043 0.017  0.006  0.075
Medicare HMO:  Did not apply for subsidy  0.094 0.125 0.133  0.110  0.111
Medicare HMO:  Got subsidy  0.004 0.002 0.000  0.000  0.002
Medicare HMO:  Denied subsidy  0.002 0.003 0.000  0.002  0.002
Medicare HMO:  Subsidy app. pending  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000
Medicare HMO:  Don’t know subsidy status 0.027 0.055 0.025  0.041  0.040
PDP: Did not apply for subsidy   0.237 0.222 0.266  0.242  0.236
PDP: Got subsidy  0.020 0.007 0.006  0.002  0.009
PDP: Denied subsidy  0.013 0.015 0.019  0.002  0.010
PDP: Subsidy application pending  0.004 0.002 0.005  0.000  0.002
Purchase 0.117 0.112 0.121  0.111  0.114
None 0.073 0.070 0.082  0.069  0.071
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000
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Table 5 
Different definitions of takeup 
 
   






  D1  PDP in 2006  PDP, privately purchased or no 
coverage in 2006  4,437
  D2  PDP or MedHMO in 2006  PDP, privately purchased coverage, 
MedHMO or no coverage in 2006  5,912
  D3  PDP, MedHMO or Medicaid in 2006  PDP, privately purchased coverage, 
MedHMO, Medicaid or no coverage in 
2006 6,857
  D4  PDP in 2006  Privately purchased or no coverage in 
2004 4,652
  D5  PDP or MedHMO in 2006  Privately purchased coverage, 
MedHMO or no coverage in 2004  5,784
  D6  PDP, MedHMO or Medicaid in 2006 Privately  purchased  coverage, 
MedHMO, Medicaid or no coverage in 
2004 6,675
  D7  “Did you sign up for Part D”=yes  All respondents 65+ with Medicare in 
2006 10,175
“Extra Help” subsidy 
  X1  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes  PDP 06  2,572
  X2  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=yes 
PDP 06 + MedHMO 06,  
excluding those missing subsidy data  3,667
  X3  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=yes 
PDP 06 + MedHMO 06,  
including those missing subsidy data  4,066
  X4  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=yes  
+ MedHMO06 with subsidy=missing 
PDP 06 + MedHMO 06,  
including those missing subsidy data 
4,066
  X5  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ Medicaid 06 
PDP 06 + Medicaid 06 
3,517
  X6  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ Medicaid 06 
PDP 06 + MedHMO 06 + Medicaid 06 
excluding those missing subsidy data 
4,612
  X7  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ Medicaid 06 
PDP 06 + MedHMO 06 + Medicaid 06 
including those missing subsidy data 
5,011
  X8  PDP 06 with subsidy=yes 
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=yes  
+ MedHMO 06 with subsidy=missing 
+ Medicaid 06 
PDP 06 + MedHMO 06 + Medicaid 06 
including those missing subsidy data 
5,011
  X9  “Have you applied for extra help”=yes  “Did you sign up for Part D”=yes  7,796
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Table 6 
Average takeup using different definitions of takeup 











high       Total 
Row percent  0.304 0.282 0.054  0.361  1.000
Sample n  3,302 2,923 523  3,427  10,175
    
Definition of Part D takeup     
    D1   0.590 0.575 0.592  0.579  0.582
    D2   0.679 0.703 0.691  0.690  0.691
    D3   0.759 0.723 0.699  0.693  0.725
    D4   0.417 0.424 0.436  0.442  0.429
    D5   0.541 0.583 0.591  0.576  0.568
    D6   0.655 0.607 0.602  0.580  0.616
    D7   0.497 0.384 0.431  0.355  0.411
Definition of subsidy takeup           
    X1   0.134 0.094 0.100  0.019  0.081
    X2   0.116 0.075 0.069  0.018  0.067
    X3   0.107 0.065 0.065  0.016  0.060
    X4   0.185 0.194 0.120  0.119  0.161
    X5   0.500 0.228 0.149  0.043  0.290
    X6   0.423 0.170 0.105  0.035  0.224
    X7   0.401 0.150 0.099  0.031  0.205
    X8   0.453 0.266 0.152  0.133  0.290
    X9   0.078 0.047 0.043  0.012  0.044
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Table 7 
Regression models: Takeup of Part D 
  Definition of Part D takeup used as dependent variable (see Table 5) 
  1  2 3 4 5  6  7 
No. of conditions with rx  0.046  0.042  0.04  0.02  0.024  0.033  0.016 
  [0.009]  [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008]  [0.007] [0.006] 
Self-reported health 
(1=Ex,  5=Poor)  0.015  0.007 0.012 0.017 0.008  0.013  0.027 
  [0.008]  [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007]  [0.006] [0.005] 
Memory  score  0.004  0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004  0.003  -0.001 
  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] 
Memory score missing  0.032  0.019  0.028  -0.003  0.011  0.029  0.003 
  [0.035]  [0.029] [0.025] [0.035] [0.032]  [0.028] [0.023] 
Age  -0.006  -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004  -0.005  -0.003 
  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] 
Married  0.02 0.032 0.009 0.068 0.073  0.040  -0.025 
  [0.017]  [0.014] [0.012] [0.017] [0.015]  [0.014] [0.011] 
Black  -0.018  -0.023 -0.021 -0.060 -0.050  -0.032  -0.090 
  [0.058]  [0.046] [0.036] [0.060] [0.051]  [0.041] [0.034] 
Nonwhite  -0.001  0.002 0.039 0.015 0.005  0.051  0.082 
  [0.052]  [0.040] [0.031] [0.054] [0.045]  [0.036] [0.030] 
Hispanic 0.016  0.099  0.137  -0.101  0.042  0.124  0.08 
  [0.040]  [0.028] [0.022] [0.038] [0.030]  [0.024] [0.022] 
Female  0.065  0.027 0.028 0.090 0.054  0.055  0.093 
  [0.017]  [0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.015]  [0.014] [0.011] 
Education=HS -0.015  0.007  -0.018  0.000  0.025  -0.011  -0.067 
  [0.020]  [0.016] [0.014] [0.019] [0.017]  [0.016] [0.013] 
Education=Some college  -0.005  0.018  -0.008  0.009  0.042  0.000  -0.068 
  [0.024]  [0.019] [0.018] [0.024] [0.021]  [0.019] [0.016] 
Education=College 0.005  0.016  -0.005  0.013  0.027  -0.006  -0.062 
  [0.025]  [0.021] [0.019] [0.025] [0.023]  [0.021] [0.016] 
Income decile  -0.003  -0.001  -0.004  0.001  -0.001  -0.006  -0.010 
  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] 
Asset  decile  0.004  0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002  -0.001  0.001 
  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.002] 
Constant  0.854  0.952 1.018 0.425 0.694  0.875  0.592 
  [0.105]  [0.086] [0.076] [0.104] [0.094]  [0.085] [0.069] 
Observations  4,437  5,912 6,857 4,652 5,784  6,675  10,175 
Standard errors in brackets   24
Table 8 
Regression model: Applications for subsidy 
  Definition of subsidy takeup used as dependent variable (see Table 5) 
  1  2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9 
No. of conds w/rx  0.008  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.019  0.013  0.012  0.01  0.002 
  [0.006]  [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]  [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.003] 
Self-reported health 
(1=Ex,  5=Poor)  0.018  0.020 0.018 0.015  0.036  0.039  0.038  0.032  0.013 
  [0.006]  [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]  [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] 
Memory score  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.002  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.004  0.000 
  [0.002]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Memory score 
missing  -0.025  -0.018 -0.016 -0.044  -0.014  -0.006  -0.004  -0.023  -0.004 
  [0.026]  [0.020] [0.018] [0.029]  [0.030] [0.025] [0.024] [0.028] [0.011] 
Age  -0.003  -0.003 -0.002 -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002 
  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Married -0.021  -0.022  -0.021  -0.02  -0.106  -0.099  -0.097  -0.089  -0.013 
  [0.012]  [0.010] [0.009] [0.013]  [0.016] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.005] 
Black  0.008  0.011 0.009 0.076  0.002  0.005  -0.006  0.033  -0.018 
  [0.042]  [0.030] [0.028] [0.043]  [0.041] [0.034] [0.032] [0.039] [0.016] 
Nonwhite -0.013  -0.02  -0.017  -0.074  0.12  0.102  0.108  0.066  0.024 
  [0.037]  [0.026] [0.024] [0.037]  [0.035] [0.029] [0.028] [0.033] [0.014] 
Hispanic -0.027  -0.04  -0.037  -0.006  0.276  0.184  0.175  0.176  -0.033 
  [0.028]  [0.018] [0.016] [0.026]  [0.025] [0.021] [0.019] [0.023] [0.010] 
Female 0.008  0.011  0.012  -0.018  0.011  0.023  0.024  -0.003  0.011 
  [0.012]  [0.009] [0.008] [0.013]  [0.016] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.005] 
Education=HS -0.03  -0.023  -0.023  0.000  -0.095  -0.103  -0.105  -0.078  -0.015 
  [0.014]  [0.011] [0.010] [0.016]  [0.018] [0.015] [0.014] [0.016] [0.006] 
Education=Some 
college -0.034  -0.017  -0.017  0.003  -0.109  -0.101  -0.100  -0.077  -0.015 
  [0.017]  [0.013] [0.012] [0.019]  [0.022] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] [0.008] 
Education=College -0.066  -0.050 -0.046 -0.049  -0.121  -0.115  -0.107  -0.106  -0.031 
  [0.019]  [0.014] [0.013] [0.020]  [0.024] [0.019] [0.018] [0.022] [0.008] 
Income decile  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  0.002  -0.016  -0.016  -0.015  -0.009  -0.002 
  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Asset  decile  -0.009  -0.008 -0.007 -0.011  -0.022  -0.017  -0.016  -0.019  -0.005 
  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] 
Constant  0.314  0.296 0.269 0.384  0.742  0.673  0.640  0.715  0.181 
  [0.077]  [0.059] [0.054] [0.084]  [0.094] [0.078] [0.073] [0.086] [0.033] 
Observations 2,572  3,667  4,066 4,066 3,517 4,612  5,011 5,011 7,796
Standard errors in Brackets.   
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Table 9 
Stated reasons for not enrolling in Part D 
  Rx coverage in 2006   
 Purchase  None  Total 
Sample n  1,118  728  1,846 
(1)    Already have good coverage  0.617  0.113  0.423 
(2)    Didn't know it was available  0.023  0.014  0.019 
(3)    Heard about it too late  0.008  0.019  0.012 
(4)    Medicare plan too expensive  0.029  0.107  0.059 
(5)    Medicare plan too restrictive  0.002  0.005  0.003 
(6)    Haven't made a decision yet  0.032  0.129  0.069 
(7A)  Other: no additional info  0.011  0.036  0.021 
(7B)  Other: text = no meds  0.062  0.217  0.122 
(7C)  Other: text = other coverage  0.045  0.038  0.042 
(7D)  Other: text = other  0.109  0.273  0.172 
 Advised  not  to  3 1  4 
 Can't  afford  1 3  4 
 Confusion  37 55  92 
 Enrolled/ing  3 5  8 
  Family didn't allow  1 3  4 
 Foreign  Meds  0 5  5 
 Forgot  2 5  7 
 Free  meds  2 5  7 
 Future  5 2  7 
 Government  6 4  10 
 Ineligible  15 16  31 
 Misc  7 7  14 
 No  Benefit  4 10  14 
  No Info received  2 3  5 
 No  need  10 12  22 
 No  reason  8 14  22 
 No  time  1 2  3 
  Prefers Natural Herbs  0 4  4 
 Rip  off  7 18  25 
 Skeptical  7 17  24 
 Still  deciding  3 6  9 
 Total  124 197  321 
(8A)  Why not enroll = DK  0.013  0.010  0.012 
(8B)  Why not enroll = missing  0.000  0.002  0.001 
(8C)  Missing data on Part D enrollment  0.050  0.038  0.046 
Total 1.000  1.000  1.000   26
Table 10 
Stated reasons for not applying for subsidy 
 All  income/asset  levels  Subsidy-eligible only 
  MedHMO  Part D  Total  MedHMO  Part D  Total 
Sample n  1,475  2,591  4,066  384  875 1,259
(1)   Too  much  income  0.183  0.325  0.269  0.114  0.173 0.153
(2)   Too  much  wealth  0.031  0.045  0.040  0.018  0.030 0.026
(3)   Too  much  resources  0.024  0.045  0.037  0.014  0.026 0.022
(4)    Didn't know about it  0.189  0.291  0.252  0.260  0.414 0.362
(5)   Too  much  bother/confusing  0.006  0.018  0.013  0.010  0.033 0.025
(6)    Haven't gotten around to it  0.005  0.016  0.012  0.013  0.030 0.025
(7A)  Other: no additional info  0.028  0.015  0.020  0.031  0.008 0.016
(7B)  Other: text = no meds  0.035  0.041  0.039  0.042  0.037 0.039
(7C)  Other: text = other coverage  0.105  0.039  0.065  0.116  0.050 0.072
(7D)  Other: text = no need for it  0.059  0.066  0.063  0.067  0.067 0.067
(7E)  Other: text = OK w/o it  0.021  0.020  0.020  0.029  0.017 0.021
(7F)  Other: text = other  0.036  0.048  0.044  0.033  0.071 0.058
 Advised  not  to  1 1 2 0  0 0
 Believe  Ineligible  9 27 36 4  12 16
 Confusion  8 21 29 2  8 10
 Didn't  make  decision  2 6 8 1  1 2
  Didn't want to  2 1 3 1  0 1
 Dislike  program  0 5 5 0  2 2
 Enrolled  3 6 9 0  3 3
 Foreign  meds  0 1 1 0  0 0
 Forgot  0 2 2 0  1 1
 Free  meds  4 2 6 2  1 3
 Future  1 2 3 0  2 2
 Government  1 1 2 0  0 0
 Misc.  2 10 12 0  7 7
  No Social Security  2 0 2 0  0 0
 No  reason  10 28 38 4  15 19
 En  Español  9 6 15 2  4 6
 Total  54 119 173 16  56 72
(8A)  Missing all subsidy data   0.263  0.000  0.103  0.220  0.001 0.076
(8B) Don’t  know  0.015  0.028  0.023  0.028  0.038 0.034
(8C)  Refused  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.005  0.005 0.005
Total 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000
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Table 11 
Self-reported difficulty making decision 
 
 
Type of Rx coverage in 2006   
 Employer  Medicaid MedHMO Part  D  Purchase  None  Total 
How difficult was decision? 
Very 0.028  0.069 0.041 0.154 0.044  0.054 0.069
Somewhat 0.051  0.055 0.039 0.217 0.072  0.071 0.096
Not very   0.097  0.088 0.075 0.164 0.119  0.137 0.116
Not at all  0.693  0.213 0.401 0.215 0.548  0.453 0.455
Didn't decide myself  0.026  0.064 0.023 0.056 0.038  0.035 0.038
Auto-enrolled 0.031  0.393 0.348 0.142 0.000  0.000 0.130
DK 0.003  0.005 0.006 0.003 0.027  0.019 0.007
RF 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000
Missing 0.070  0.113 0.067 0.049 0.152  0.230 0.089
Total 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
             
Fraction reporting very or somewhat difficult decision, by insurance coverage and memory score 
Memory  score:             
0-4 0.117 0.139 0.085 0.327 0.164  0.119 0.182
5-6 0.093 0.172 0.089 0.342 0.147  0.150 0.184
7 0.081 0.139 0.050 0.359 0.096  0.187 0.168
8 0.115 0.149 0.129 0.415 0.132  0.153 0.195
9 0.104 0.136 0.073 0.456 0.118  0.131 0.200
10 0.051 0.165 0.122 0.400 0.112  0.267 0.174
11 0.079 0.136 0.078 0.432 0.103  0.148 0.183
12-13 0.071 0.120 0.079 0.431 0.185  0.175 0.188
14+ 0.085 0.032 0.073 0.414 0.196  0.198 0.189
Total 0.086  0.145 0.088 0.397 0.141  0.169 0.185
Note that Medicaid enrollees’ responses about difficulty are taken at face value even 
though they were, in fact, all automatically enrolled.   28
Table 12 




Type of Rx coverage in 2006   
 Employer  Medicaid MedHMO Part  D  Purchase  None  Total 
How confident are you that you made the right decision? 
Very 0.752  0.286 0.436 0.404 0.582  0.432 0.535
Somewhat 0.110  0.137 0.104 0.290 0.171  0.197 0.171
Not very   0.013  0.040 0.022 0.053 0.035  0.039 0.031
Not at all  0.013  0.018 0.010 0.037 0.023  0.046 0.023
Auto-enrolled 0.031  0.393 0.348 0.142 0.000  0.000 0.130
DK 0.007  0.013 0.010 0.025 0.031  0.040 0.018
RF 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  0.001 0.000
Missing 0.073  0.113 0.070 0.049 0.158  0.245 0.092
Total 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
    
How likely is it that you will sign up for Medicare prescription drug coverage next year? 
Very 0.078  0.515 0.330 0.703 0.082  0.170 0.318
Somewhat 0.066  0.148 0.099 0.159 0.133  0.176 0.117
Not very   0.167  0.080 0.148 0.036 0.241  0.225 0.136
Not at all  0.656  0.152 0.371 0.044 0.452  0.330 0.370
Missing 0.033  0.106 0.053 0.058 0.092  0.099 0.059
Total 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000
Note that Medicaid enrollees’ responses about confidence are taken at face value even 
though they were, in fact, all automatically enrolled. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Patterns of response to “Did you sign up for part d” and “Did you apply for the subsidy”  
By Rx coverage status in 2006 
 
 
  Assigned 2006 Rx coverage status 
 Employer Medicaid MedHMO Part  D  Purchase None  Total 
“Yes” to “Did you sign up for Part D?”  0.079 0.705 0.483 1.000  0.000 0.000 0.416
Of those who said yes to Part D:       
  “I was automatically enrolled”   0.410 0.538 0.697 0.146  -  -  0.317
  “I applied for the subsidy”  0.031 0.094 0.055 0.085  -  -  0.078
  Responses to subsidy question, 
 including  missing:   
  Yes  0.007 0.068 0.028 0.084  0.012 0.006 0.036
  No  0.687 0.770 0.715 0.909  0.566 0.529 0.730
  Missing  0.306 0.162 0.258 0.007  0.422 0.466 0.234  30
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